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Confidence and Constraint: Public Opinion, Judicial 
Independence, and the Roberts Court 
Alison Higgins Merrill,* Nicholas D. Conway,** and 
Joseph Daniel Ura*** 
ABSTRACT 
Although Americans continue to express greater and more stable 
levels of confidence in the Supreme Court than in Congress or the 
executive branch of the federal government, the Supreme Court’s 
public standing has fallen steadily over the last fifteen years. A 
growing body of research in political science and related fields 
indicates that declining public support undermines judicial 
independence. To illustrate these effects, we estimate a statistical 
model of the Supreme Court’s propensity to invalidate federal laws 
on constitutional grounds in each term from 1973 through 2014 and 
generate predictions of the number of federal laws struck down by 
the Supreme Court under various political conditions. This analysis 
shows how the decline in public support during the Roberts Court 
year has affected the Justices’ willingness to invalidate federal laws. 
We argue that evidence of a link between persistent declines in the 
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Supreme Court’s public standing and lost judicial independence 
suggest that Chief Justice Roberts take a more aggressive public 
stance as an advocate for the Supreme Court. 
For more than a decade, the Supreme Court’s public standing has 
been in decline.1 Although the Court continues to enjoy substantially 
more confidence than Congress or the executive branch, public 
support for the Court has recently reached at the lowest levels ever 
recorded in the survey record.2 To be sure, the decline in public 
 
 1 Political science generally recognizes two classes of attitudes about 
political institutions including constitutional courts in particular: specific 
support and diffuse support. DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF 
POLITICAL LIFE (1965). As defined by David Easton, specific support refers 
to “the favorable attitudes and predisposition stimulated by outputs that are 
perceived by [individuals] to meet their demands as they arise or in 
anticipation.” Id. at 273. In other words, specific support is the belief that an 
institution produces outcomes consistent with one’s interests and 
preferences. Gibson refers to specific support as “performance satisfaction.” 
James L. Gibson, Public Reverence for the United States Supreme Court: Is 
the Court Invincible? (2012) (unpublished manuscript on file with the 
authors). Conversely, diffuse support refers to “reservoir of favorable 
attitudes or goodwill that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to 
which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their 
wants.” EASTON, supra, at 273. Diffuse support represents a willingness to 
accept and abide by an institution’s decisions even when those decisions are 
inconsistent with one’s interests and preferences. Gibson equates diffuse 
support with “legitimacy” and “loyalty.” Gibson, supra at 17. Unless 
otherwise noted, we use the general terms “public support” and “public 
standing” to refer to specific support and its indicators.  
See also JOSEPH DANIEL URA & ALISON HIGGINS, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND PUBLIC OPINION (Lee Epstein & Stefanie A. Lindquist eds., 2017). 
 2  Tom W. Smith, Peter V. Marsden & Michael Hout, General Social 
Surveys, 1972-2014, NAT’L OPINION RES. CTR. (2015), 
http://sda.berkeley.edu/sdaweb/analysis/?dataset=gss14; Supreme Court, 
GALLUP (2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx; Few 
Conservatives View the Roberts Court as Conservative: Supreme Court’s 
Favorable Rating Still at Historic Low, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 25, 2013), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/20
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support for the Court started before Justice Roberts became chief 
justice but it has continued, if not accelerated, throughout his tenure. 
Hostility toward the Court undermines the Justices’ ability to use 
their institutional prerogatives to shape legal and political outcomes. 
Research in political science demonstrates that declining confidence 
in the Court undermines judicial independence: It creates political 
space for Congress and the President to penalize the Court, which in 
turn may lessen the Court’s willingness to invalidate federal laws.3 
Why open the door for congressional sanctions when it’s possible to 
avoid them altogether by exercising judicial restraint? While low 
confidence in the elected branches may offset the political costs of 
 
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/3-25-
13%20Supreme%20Court%20Release.pdf; Views of Supreme Court Little 
Changed as Major Rulings Loom, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 20, 2015), 
http://www.people-press.org/files/2015/04/4-20-15-Supreme-Court-
release.pdf; James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Change in Institutional 
Support for the U.S. Supreme Court: Is the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy 
Imperiled by the Decisions it Makes?, 80 PUB. OPINION Q. 622 (2016). 
 3 The elected branches of government, especially Congress, can 
penalize the Supreme Court in numerous ways. As Murphy notes, for 
example, members of Congress have “an impressive array of weapons which 
can be used against judicial power. They can impeach and remove the 
Justices, increase the number of Justices to any level whatsoever, regulate 
Court procedure, abolish any tier of courts, confer or withdraw federal 
jurisdiction almost at will, cut off the money that is necessary to run the 
courts or to carry out specific decisions or sets of decisions, pass laws to 
reverse statutory interpretations, and propose constitutional amendments to 
reverse particular decisions or to curtail directly judicial power.” Walter 
Murphy, The Elements of Judicial Strategy (1964), U. CHI. PRESS. TOM S. 
CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 26 (2011). Throughout this 
Article, we refer to these types of actions as “court curbing.” Walter 
Murphy, The Elements of Judicial Strategy (1964), U. CHI. PRESS. TOM S. 
CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (2011), see especially 
pages 982–84 showing inter alia that high public support for the Supreme 
Court mitigates the negative association between congressional court 
curbing bills and invalidations of federal laws. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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invalidating laws, the Court nonetheless remains in a precarious 
position. Additional erosion of its public support or an increase in 
confidence in Congress or the President could further curtail judicial 
independence.4 
To demonstrate the consequences of these political dynamics and 
the magnitude of their effects, we estimate a statistical model of the 
Court’s willingness to invalidate federal laws on constitutional 
grounds in each term between 1973 and 2014. This model allows us 
to predict the number of federal laws struck down by the Court under 
various political conditions—including changes in public support for 
the Court and Congress. 
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Since 1973, the General Social Survey (GSS) has asked a 
representative sample of Americans to evaluate various public and 
private entities. It asks respondents, “I am going to name some 
institutions in this country. As far as the people running these 
institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of 
confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in 
them?” The Supreme Court, Congress, and the “[e]xecutive branch of 
the federal government” are among the institutions the GSS 
identifies.5 The resulting GSS confidence dataset is among the 
longest-running and most complete record of Americans’ evaluations 
of their governing institutions6;it is especially useful because it asks 
about multiple institutions using the same question stem, permitting 
reasonable comparisons of evaluations of the three branches of 
 
 4 Joseph Daniel Ura & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, An Appeal to the People: 
Public Opinion and Congressional Support for the Supreme Court, 72 J. 
POL. 939 (2010). 
 5 Smith et al., supra note 5.  
 6 Gregory A. Caldeira, Courts and Public Opinion, in THE AMERICAN 
COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 303–34 (1990); JOSEPH DANIEL URA & 
ALISON HIGGINS, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC OPINION (Lee Epstein 
& Stefanie A. Lindquist eds. 2017). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/20
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government. Additionally, responses tap individual attitudes related 
to both specific support (performance approval and policy agreement) 
and diffuse support (legitimacy, institutional loyalty).7 For these 
reasons, political scientists often use these confidence data to 
measure public support for the Supreme Court and the other branches 
of government.8 
Figure 1 shows GSS confidence data for each branch of the 
national government.9 The top panel is the percentage of GSS 
respondents reporting that they have a “great deal” of confidence in 
each institution.10 The middle panel shows the percentage of 
respondents saying they have “hardly any” confidence in each 
institution. The bottom panel reports the ratio of “great deal” of 
confidence respondents to “hardly any” confidence respondents. 
The GSS data show that Americans’ confidence in their governing 
institutions has declined substantially over the last four decades, and 
this decline has been particularly acute for elected branches. In 1973, 
29% and 24% of Americans said they had a great deal of confidence 
in the executive branch and Congress. In 2014, 11% said they had a 
great deal of confidence in the executive branch, and only 6% 
 
7 James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, 
Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 354 (2003) especially pages 360–63. 
8See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 6. See also Robert H. Durr, James B. 
Gilmour & Christina Wolbrecht, Explaining Congressional Approval, 41 
AM. J.  POL. SCI. 175 (1997) especially pages 668–70 (Durr and his co-
authors refer to the General Social Survey confidence data as the “National 
Opinion Research Center” or “NORC” data—The National Opinion 
Research Center is the organization that conducts the General Social 
Survey). 
 9 Smith et al., supra note 5.  
 10  The GSS was not conducted in 1979, 1981, 1992, or in odd-
numbered years since 1993. In this analysis, values for missing years 
average confidence levels are imputed by taking the average of the 
preceding and following years’ values. The latest GSS data now publicly 
available for this analysis is from 2014. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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reported a great deal of confidence in Congress. In the same period, 
the percentages of Americans saying they had hardly any confidence 
in the executive branch grew from 19% to 45%, and claims of hardly 
any confidence in Congress increased from 16% to 53%. 
Historically, the standing of the Court has been higher and more 
stable than evaluations of Congress and the presidency. In the first 
three decades covered by the GSS, between 1973 and 2002, the 
percentage of Americans reporting a great deal of confidence in the 
Supreme Court dropped to 30% or below for only four years and was 
never lower than 26%. In those years, only 14% of respondents on 
average said they had hardly any confidence in the Court. 
However, Americans’ confidence in the Supreme Court began a 
steady decline in 2002. Expressions of a great deal of confidence in 
the Court have decreased from 37% to 24%, and expressions of 
hardly any confidence have increased from 11% to 20%. The ratio of 
“great deal” of confidence in the Supreme Court responses to “hardly 
any” confidence responses in the GSS has been less than 2:1 since 
2009; it reached the lowest level in the survey’s history in 2014, the 
last year of available data. Although confidence in the Court remains 
robust compared to Congress and the presidency, it is increasingly 
difficult to deny that Americans’ view of the Supreme Court is 
dimming.  
Other surveys lend support to this conclusion, as Figure 2 
indicates.11 The top panel shows Gallup data from 1973 to 2016 on 
public confidence in the Court. In this poll, Gallup asks respondents 
to choose among “a great deal, quite a lot, some, or very little” 
confidence and records volunteered responses of “none.” The middle 
panel shows data from Pew Research Center surveys conducted 
between 1987 and 2015 asking, “Would you say your overall opinion 
of the Supreme Court is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly 
 
 11 Supreme Court, supra note 5. Few Conservatives View the Roberts 
Court as Conservative: Supreme Court’s Favorable Rating Still at Historic 
Low, supra note 4; Views of Supreme Court Little Changed as Major 
Rulings Loom, supra note 4. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/20
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unfavorable, or very unfavorable?” The final panel displays Gallup 
data from 2000 through 2016 on whether Americans “approve or 
disapprove of the way the Supreme Court is handling its job?” Each 
of these measures of the public’s view of the Supreme Court 
indicates a clear and generally steady decline in favorable attitudes 
about the Supreme Court over the last fifteen years. 
CONSEQUENCES OF DECLINING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE SUPREME 
COURT 
A substantial body of research in the social sciences and law 
demonstrates that positive public perceptions of the Court (and 
constitutional courts more generally) forestall or buffer political 
attacks from other branches of government and create electoral 
incentives for the other branches to accept judicial authority.12 When 
 
12 The Court’s Justices may cultivate public support by maintaining 
ideological consistency between its decisions and public mood (see for 
example Christopher J. Casillas, Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, How 
Public Opinion Constrains the U.S. Supreme Court, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 74 
(2011); Robert H. Durr, Andrew D. Martin & Christina Wolbrecht, 
Ideological Divergence and Public Support for the Supreme Court, 44 AM. 
J.  POL. SCI. 768 (2000); Kevin McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least 
Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court 
Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018 (2004); William 
Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a 
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme 
Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87 (1993)), using symbols of 
institutional legitimacy (see, for example, James L. Gibson & Michael J. 
Nelson, The Legitimacy of the Supreme Court: Conventional Wisdoms, and 
Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 201 (2014)), 
adjusting the language used in opinions (see, for example, Ryan C. Black, 
Ryan J. Owens, Justin Wedeking & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The Influence of 
Public Sentiment on Supreme Court Opinion Clarity, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 
703 (2016)), and pursuing greater consensus (see, for example Gregory A. 
Caldeira & Christopher J. W. Zorn, Of Time and Consensual Norms in the 
Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 874 (1998); Joseph Daniel Ura & Carla 
Washington University Open Scholarship
Document7  12/17/17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
216 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 54:209 
 
 
 
 
 
 
support for courts is sufficiently high, election-minded officials are 
prompted “to respect judicial decisions as well as the institutional 
integrity of a court” by the “fear of . . . a [public] backlash” against 
court-curbing activity.13 
This research indicates that a decline in public confidence in the 
Court can erode judicial independence in ways big and small.14 
Importantly, disapproval and distrust of the judiciary could encourage 
court-curbing actions by Congress.15 In an extreme historical 
example, unpopular Federalist efforts to seat some of the “midnight 
judges” appointed by Johns Adams undermined public confidence in 
the judiciary and prompted Jeffersonian Republicans to adopt the 
Repeal Act 1802, eliminating judgeships, limiting the Court to one 
term per year, and forcing justices to ride circuit.16 In turn, court 
curbing or the threat of court curbing can lead to judicial self-
restraint.17 
The recent decline in public confidence in the Court has similarly 
contributed to erosion of the Court’s independence during the Chief 
 
M. Flink, Managing the Supreme Court: The Chief Justice, Management, 
and Consensus, 26 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 185 (2016); James R. 
Zink, James F. Spriggs II & John T. Scott, Courting the Public: The 
Influence of Decision Attributes on Individuals’ Views of Court Opinions, 71 
J. POLITICS 909 (2009)). 
 13 Georg Vanberg, Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic 
Approach to Constitutional Review 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 346, 347 (2001); see 
generally CLARK, supra note 6; Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the Struggle 
for Judicial Supremacy, 30 L. & SOC’Y REV. 87 (1996); James L. Gibson, 
Gregory A. Caldeira & Vanessa A. Baird, On the Legitimacy of National 
High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343 (1998); Michelle M. Taylor-
Robinson & Joseph Daniel Ura, Public Opinion and Conflict in the 
Separation of Powers: Understanding the Honduran Coup of 2009, 25 J. 
THEORETICAL POL. 105 (2013). 
 14 Caldeira, supra note 8; URA & HIGGINS, supra note 8.  
 15 See Ura & Wohlfarth, supra note 5; Vanberg, supra note 14. 
 16   Knight & Epstein, supra note 14.  
 17 CLARK, supra note 6.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/20
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Justice Roberts’ tenure. This erosion is evident in political actors 
pressuring the Court to reach particular decisions, or threatening the 
Court’s independence in response to decisions already made, 
including: President Obama’s 2010 State of the Union criticisms of 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,18 Chief Justice 
Roberts’s “wobbly” vote in National Federation of Independent 
Businesses v. Sebelius,19 efforts by the Clinton campaign to try 
“scaring” the Court20 into upholding subsidy payments to participants 
in federal Affordable Care Act exchanges in King v. Burwell,21 and 
Senate Republicans’ refusal to act on the nomination of Merrick 
Garland to succeed Justice Antonin Scalia.22 Holding all else 
constant, greater public confidence in the Court would have raised 
the expected political costs (and mitigated the political benefits) of 
criticizing the Court’s past or prospective actions. While any 
particular attempt to influence the Court may have still occurred, the 
decline in the public’s trust in the Court has made these attempts 
 
 18 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010); 
Barack Obama, Fmr. President of the United States, State of the Union 
Address (Jan. 27, 2010) (transcript available in the University of California 
at Santa Barbara American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=87433 (last visited 
March 7, 2017); Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke, in Front 
of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/us/politics/29scotus.html. 
 19 URA & HIGGINS, supra note 8; Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 123 S.Ct. 603 (2012); Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to 
Uphold Health Care Law, CBS NEWS (July 2, 2012, 9:43 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-health-
care-law/. 
 20 Robert Post, Rolling Justice Roberts, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 14, 2016), 
http://bit.ly/2gEJupw. 
 21 King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 475 (2015); Post, supra note 24. 
 22 Harper Neidig, No Hearing for Obama’s Supreme Court Nominee, 
McConnell Says, THE HILL (Mar. 16, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-
briefing-room/news/273230-mcconnell-no-hearing-for-garland. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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systematically more likely to occur. 
ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE FOR 
INDEPENDENCE 
To demonstrate the consequences of these political dynamics and 
show the magnitude of their effects, we estimate a statistical model of 
the Supreme Court’s propensity to invalidate federal laws on 
constitutional grounds in each term from 1973 through 2014 
expressed as a function of public evaluations of the Supreme Court 
and Congress. 
We use the number of federal laws struck down by the Court as an 
indicator of judicial independence. In the case of the Supreme Court, 
scholars have identified the latent quality of judicial independence 
with the Court’s constitutional invalidation of federal laws.23 Striking 
down acts of Congress on constitutional grounds is an act of judicial 
power that the elected branches cannot—at least not theoretically—
overturn by an ordinary statute.24 A decision to invalidate a federal 
law hinges on the Court’s willingness to replace Congress’s views of 
constitutional limits on federal power with its own. Therefore, 
considering the constitutionality of federal laws demonstrates judicial 
independence. Holding all else equal, a more independent Court’s 
willingness to strike down acts of Congress should yield more 
 
 23 CLARK, supra note 6, 977–78; Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, 
The Supreme Court, Congress, and Judicial Review, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1323, 
1339–41 (2005). 
 24 There are of course rare examples of Supreme Court decisions 
striking down federal laws on constitutional grounds abrogated by 
subsequent acts of Congress. Hammer v. Daggenhart struck down the 
Keating-Owen Act, which prohibited the inter-state sale of products made 
with child labor.  See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). The Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938 later regulated working conditions contrary to 
Hammer and was upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Darby 
Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/20
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invalidations.25 
To measure the public’s disposition toward the Court and 
Congress, we turn to the General Social Survey.26 We measure the 
public standing of the Court as the percentage of GSS respondents in 
each survey year expressing “hardly any” confidence in the Supreme 
Court,27 and the public standing of Congress as the percentage of 
GSS respondents saying they have “hardly any” confidence in 
Congress. We expect that the model will return estimates of a 
 
 25 We use Whittington’s (2005) count of federal laws struck down by 
the Supreme Court reported by Clark (2011) and extended by us through 
2014. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND INTERPRETATION: 
HAVE THE COURTS BECOME SOVEREIGN WHEN INTERPRETING THE 
CONSTITUTION? (2005); CLARK, supra note 6. The number of federal laws 
invalidated by the Supreme Court in a particular term is, of course, an 
aggregation of the outputs of nested political processes beginning with 
Congress making laws in the first place, laws generating cases, lower courts 
making decisions anticipating the reaction of higher courts, litigants making 
strategic decisions about pursuing appeals, and the Supreme Court’s Justices 
making strategic decisions about whether or not to grant certiorari. The 
study of how choices made in earlier stages of these related events influence 
choices made in later stages is now unfolding in political science, law, and 
related fields. See, e.g., Matthew E. K. Hall & Joseph Daniel Ura, Judicial 
Majoritarianism, J. POL. (2015); Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Pulling 
Punches: Congressional Constraints on the Supreme Courts Constitutional 
Rulings, 1987-2000, 31 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 533 (2006); Anna Harvey & Barry 
Friedman, Ducking Trouble: Induced Selection Bias in the Supreme Court’s 
Agenda, 1987-2000, 71 J. POL. 574 (2009); Kevin McGuire & James A. 
Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme 
Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018 (2004); Kevin 
T. McGuire, Georg Vanberg, Charles E. Smith Jr. & Gregory A. Caldeira, 
Measuring Policy Content on the U.S. Supreme Court, 71 J. POL. 1305 
(2009)). However, like most empirical analyses of Supreme Court decision-
making, the analyses reported here focus only on the resolution of cases that 
reach the merits stage in the first place. 
 26 Smith et al., supra note 5. 
 27 CLARK, supra note 6, at 125. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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negative association between disaffection from the Supreme Court 
and the number of laws struck down in each year. Conversely, we 
also expect to find a positive relationship between mistrust of 
Congress and the number of federal laws invalidated by the Court. 
The dependent variable in the analysis is the number of federal 
laws invalidated by the Supreme Court in each year, a count with a 
lower bound of zero. In the absence of strong autocorrelation or over-
dispersion, this type of data is often modeled using the Poisson 
regression estimator.28 The annual count of federal laws invalidated 
since 1973 shows only weak autocorrelation (rt, t−1 = 0.15), and the 
time series’ estimated dispersion parameter (α) in a negative binomial 
regression is zero. We therefore use the Poisson regression approach 
to model the annual number of federal laws invalidated by the 
Supreme Court expressed as a function of public evaluations of the 
Supreme Court (% hardly any confidence), public evaluations of 
Congress (% hardly any confidence), as well as dummy variable for 
each natural court to control for otherwise unmodeled factors arising 
from the composition of the Court. Data are available from 1973, 
when the GSS first asks its institutional confidence battery, through 
2014.29 Model estimates are reported in Table 1. 
RESULTS 
The statistical estimates align with prior findings about the role of 
public opinion in shaping judicial independence. Holding all else 
constant, as the public becomes more hostile to the Supreme Court, 
the Justices’ propensity to invalidate federal laws decreases 
significantly. Conversely, as the public becomes more hostile to 
Congress, the Justices’ propensity to strike down federal laws 
increases significantly. These results provide further evidence that 
public evaluations of the coordinate branches of the national 
 
 28 Patrick T. Brandt et al., Dynamic Modeling for Persistent Event 
Count Time Series, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 823 (2000). 
 29 Smith et al., supra note 5.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/20
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government influence how the Supreme Court uses its institutional 
prerogatives. 
 We can use the model estimates to generate predictions of 
how many laws the Court will invalidate in a given year under 
various conditions. Figure 3 shows the predicted number of federal 
laws invalidated as public evaluations of the Court and Congress 
change. The left panel shows predictions for a relatively low-level of 
“hardly any” confidence responses in the Congress (21%, about one 
standard deviation below the average level of hardly any confidence 
responses since 1973) as the public becomes less confident in the 
Court (hardly any confidence in Congress responses rising from one 
standard deviation below the mean on the left to one standard 
deviation above the mean on the right). The middle panel shows 
predictions of the number of invalidated laws when the percentage of 
GSS respondents reporting “hardly any” confidence in Congress is at 
its mean (31%) as the public becomes less confident in the Court 
(across the same range). Finally, the right panel shows predictions 
when the percentage of respondents saying they have “hardly any” 
confidence in Congress is about one standard deviation above the 
mean (31%) as mistrust of the Supreme Court rises. Predictions are 
illustrated by the solid lines with 95% confidence intervals shown by 
the dotted lines. 
The model’s predicted counts exhibit the pattern we expected. As 
the public loses confidence in the Court, the predicted number of 
invalidations falls for all levels of confidence in Congress. Increasing 
the percentage of GSS respondents expressing “hardly any” 
confidence in the Court from one standard deviation below the mean 
to one standard deviation above the mean reduces the expected 
number of federal laws invalidated each year by one to four laws, 
depending on the public’s view of Congress. Conversely, as the 
public loses confidence in Congress, the predicted number of laws 
struck down rises. Increasing the percentage of GSS respondents 
expressing “hardly any” confidence in Congress from one standard 
deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean 
increases the expected number of federal laws invalidated by one and 
one half to four laws, depending on the public’s level of confidence 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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in the Supreme Court. Together, these predictions show that the 
Court’s current (low) public standing depresses the Justices’ 
propensity to invalidate acts of Congress despite the historic lack of 
public confidence in Congress and the presidency. 
REFLECTIONS ON THE ROBERTS COURT 
The Court faces many challenges as it moves into the second 
decade of John Roberts’s service as Chief Justice. The Court faces a 
nation that is deeply divided after the recent presidential election and 
heading toward an uncertain future with an untested leader.30 In the 
near term, the Court will likely decide high-profile cases on abortion, 
the death penalty, and religious liberty. Over the next several years, 
the Court is also likely to encounter continued turnover, a steady 
stream of cases testing the limits of Republicans’ unified control of 
the federal government, and controversies over executive power 
emanating from the Trump administration. 
 
Although the Roberts Court still has political allies in Congress 
and the White House at least over the near term, the Court is fifteen 
years into a steady decline in its public standing and boasts the least 
 
 30 ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE POLARIZED PUBLIC? WHY AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT IS SO DYSFUNCTIONAL (2013) (especially 101–41); Jeffrey M. 
Jones, Record-High 77% of Americans Perceive Nation as Divided, GALLUP 
(Nov. 21, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/197828/record-high-
americans-perceive-nation-divided.aspx; Jeremy W. Peters, Megan Thee-
Brenan & Dalia Sussmannoy, Election Exit Polls Reveal a Starkly Divided 
Nation, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/us/politics/election-exit-
polls.html?_r=0. And, on the variety and difficulty of challenges facing the 
Trump administration beyond the judiciary see, for example,What’s the 
Biggest Test Trump Will Face in 2017?, POLITICO (Jan. 3, 2017), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/whats-the-biggest-test-
trump-will-face-in-2017-214594. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/20
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public confidence it has had in the last four decades.31 The Court and 
its members have little political capital to insulate their actions or 
their institution from political attacks from Congress or the President, 
especially a media-savvy president with little regard for the norms 
that traditionally structure presidential-judicial relations.32 Although 
Congress and the executive branch are even more poorly regarded 
than the Court,33 the public’s limited confidence in the judiciary 
weighs against the Supreme Court Justices’ willingness to challenge 
the elected branches of the national government and exercise their 
power of judicial review. This may become especially important over 
the long run, should Democrats eventually regain control of the 
elected branches of government, adding more direct ideological 
disagreement to the lines of conflict between the Court, Congress, 
and President. 
 
In an interview with Jeffrey Rosen conducted at the close of his 
first term as Chief Justice, John Roberts expressed keen awareness of 
the Chief Justice’s role in preserving the institutional integrity of the 
Supreme Court.34 He explained his willingness to compromise 
 
31 Smith et al., supra note 5; Supreme Court, supra note 4; Few 
Conservatives View the Roberts Court as Conservative: Supreme Court’s 
Favorable Rating Still at Historic Low, supra note 4; Views of Supreme 
Court Little Changed as Major Rulings Loom, supra note 4; Gibson & 
Nelson, supra note 4.  
 32 Peter Baker, Trump Clashes Early With Courts, Portending Years of 
Legal Battles, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/us/politics/donald-trump-mike-pence-
travel-ban-judge.html; see also Donald Trump’s Three Types of Norm 
Violations, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/12/19/donald-
trumps-three-types-of-norm-violations/?utm_term=.edfe6b0aa851. 
 33 This is evident, for example, in the GSS confidence data described 
above; Smith et al., supra note 5. 
 34 Jeffrey Rosen, Robert’s Rules, THE ATLANTIC (2007), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/robertss-
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principle with an eye toward building consensus within the Court and 
avoiding conflict with other institutions. With John Marshall’s efforts 
to promote agreement among the Justices in mind, Justice Roberts 
said, “every justice should be worried about the Court acting as a 
Court and functioning as a Court, and . . . [about] the Court as an 
institution.”35 
Despite the current Chief Justice’s strong sense of history and 
responsibility, the public’s view of “the Court as an institution” 
continues to break down under his watch.36 Although it is not clear 
that any action or set of actions within Roberts’s reach alone can 
reverse this trend, it seems that his quiet efforts to promote consensus 
and avoid conflict are not enough to prop up the Court’s public 
standing.  
Instead of emulating Chief Justice Marshall, Justice Roberts may 
be better off following the lead of a different predecessor, Chief 
Justice William Howard Taft. Although Justice Taft’s historical 
reputation suffers from his uneven record as a jurist, he was 
unquestionably among the most active and successful chief justices in 
enhancing the Court’s discretion, standing, and independence.37 Like 
Justice Roberts, Justice Taft worked to limit dissent and promote 
consensus among the Justices.38 However, Justice Taft was also a 
public advocate for the Court and the rest of the federal judiciary, 
lobbying Congress to create the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, give the Court greater discretion over its plenary docket, and 
 
rules/305559/.  
 35 Rosen, supra note 35.  
 36 Smith et al., supra note 5; Supreme Court, supra note 4. Few 
Conservatives View the Roberts Court as Conservative: Supreme Court’s 
Favorable Rating Still at Historic Low, supra note 4; Views of Supreme 
Court Little Changed as Major Rulings Loom, supra note 4; Gibson & 
Nelson, supra note 4.  
 37 Post, supra note 24.  
 38 Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: 
Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decision-making in the Taft Court, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 1267 (2001) (discussed especially on pages 1309–55). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/20
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authorize construction of a permanent, dedicated Supreme Court 
building.39 According to Anderson, Justice Taft’s career as chief 
justice “was dedicated to maintaining and strengthening the public 
reputation of the Court as . . . [a] national symbol of . . . the rule of 
law,” and “he was as aggressive in the pursuit of his agenda in the 
judicial realm as Theodore Roosevelt was in the presidential.”40 Chief 
Justice Roberts is an intelligent, articulate, and telegenic figure with a 
strong sense of the Court’s mission and an appealing vision of the 
Court’s role in American national politics. He has the makings of an 
effective public representative of the Court, and the Court as an 
institution stands to benefit from his becoming a more aggressive and 
visible advocate for it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD 
TAFT (1986); Erick Trickey, Chief Justice, Not President, Was William 
Howard Taft’s Dream Job, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Dec. 5, 2016), 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/chief-justice-not-president-was-
william-howard-tafts-dream-job-180961279/. 
 40 Donald Anderson, Building National Consensus: The Career of 
William Howard Taft, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 323, 353 (1999). 
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Figure 1: General Social Survey: Confidence in the Three 
Branches of Government 
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Figure 2: Gallup and Pew: Supreme Court Confidence, 
Favorability, and Approval 
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Figure 3: Predicted Counts of Invalidated Federal Laws 
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